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Abstract:  Infiltration-route analysis is a military application of geospatial information 
system (GIS) technology. In order to find susceptible routes, optimal-path-searching 
algorithms are applied to minimize the cost function, which is the summed result of detection 
probability. The cost function was determined according to the thermal observation device 
(TOD) detection probability, the viewshed analysis results, and two feature layers extracted 
from the vector product interim terrain data. The detection probability is computed and 
recorded for an individual cell (50 m × 50 m), and the optimal infiltration routes are 
determined with A* algorithm by minimizing the summed costs on the routes from a start 
point to an end point. In the present study, in order to simulate the dynamic nature of a real-
world problem, one thousand cost surfaces in the GIS environment were generated with 
randomly located TODs and randomly selected infiltration start points. Accordingly, one 
thousand sets of vulnerable routes for infiltration purposes could be found, which could be 
accumulated and presented as an infiltration vulnerability map. This application can be 
further utilized for both optimal infiltration routing and surveillance network design. Indeed, 
dynamic simulation in the GIS environment is considered to be a powerful and practical 
solution for optimization problems. A similar approach can be applied to the dynamic 
optimal routing for civil infrastructure, which requires consideration of terrain-related 
constraints and cost functions. 
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1. Introduction 
Routing analysis has been one of the most popular research topics in geospatial-related fields. A 
variety of computing techniques have been developed using different datasets, and the performances of 
routing analysis techniques for determining optimized routes for infrastructure facilities (e.g., gas 
pipelines) [1,2] and transportation-related projects [3-5], based on terrains and other terrain-related 
constraints, have been tested and improved. A routing algorithm based on neural network techniques 
was even applied to real-time forecasting of stream flows during storms for effective operational flood 
management [6]. Geospatial information has been widely used for military applications as well, and its 
importance in modern warfare is considered to be very valuable. It has become possible to analyze the 
terrain conditions of inaccessible areas with various sources of data collection sensors. Moreover, the 
increased spatial and spectral resolutions of sensors support more detailed analyses of terrain 
conditions. Therefore, geospatial information has been a primary resource for various military tactical 
applications, such as mission planning, terrain-contour matching for cruise-missiles and aircraft, 
viewshed analyses, infiltration-route analysis, impact – point analysis, hidden-point analysis, and 
urban–battle analysis [7-11]. 
Path planning is one of the primary research topics in many application fields, and a variety of 
methods have been used to find optimal routes [12,13]. Depth-first search and breadth-first search 
methods often require a huge amount of processing time. The greedy methods sometimes can be 
impractical for obtaining optimal solutions. Dijskstra’s algorithm [14,15] is a widely used method to 
find optimal solutions in path-searching analysis, and A* algorithm [16] can provide approximated 
optimal solutions with even less computing time. 
Meng [9] used both A* and Dijkstra’s algorithms to determine optimal paths, and found that a 
raster-based route analysis method required processing of an increased amount of data and a huge 
amount of computing time. Marti et al. [17] employed commercial ESRI software for raster-based path 
planningusing high-resolution terrain data and other information. Dynamic programming approach is 
applied to raster-based probability maps which illustrate movable and non-movable regions to 
determine the optimal paths of mountainous areas [18]. Helgason et al. [11] analyzed optimal routes in 
a static environment using the Voronoi diagram. John et al. [10] applied integer programming and a 
genetic algorithm to path-searching on a rectangular grid to optimize the local surveillance planning. 
Howard et al. [19] computed the optimal paths for planetary rovers by applying the A* algorithm to 
raster-based fuzzy maps containing five terrain categories. Niederberger [20] proposed a new 
algorithm, a revised A* algorithm, that could find routes instinctively in a fast and stable manner. 
Saha et al. [21] produced a thematic cost map in raster form, and applied Dijkstra’s algorithm for 
optimal routing between fixed origin and destination in landslide-prone area. Smith [22] used 
horizontal and vertical curvature constraints to determine the shortest gradient-constrained paths 
across terrain surfaces. These studies proved that raster-based probability maps could present an Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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appropriate environment for static-environment infiltration-route analyses with surveillance 
equipment. Caccetta et al. [23] dealt with determining an optimal transit path for a submarine moving 
by minimizing the overall probability of detection through a field of sonar sensors.  
Most current studies for optimal path determination are in the civilian use and not many military 
applications can be found. For military application thermal observation devices (TODs) combined with 
a heuristic approach based on Dijkstra’s algorithm are utilized to solve a constrained path problem in 
this study. TOD is a night vision system which can detect and quantize the thermal energy radiated 
from moving objects. The objective of this study is to present a solution for optimal infiltration-route 
analysis with TODs in a geospatial information system (GIS) environment and then to confirm its 
validity for computationally intensive simulation environment. To those ends, this paper presents a 
computational environment for infiltration-route analysis that can discover infiltration vulnerability. 
Among the possible shortest-path-searching algorithms, the A* algorithm was implemented to 
determine susceptible routes based on terrain features and surveillance networks. In the simulations, 
the surveillance networks employed TODs. An imaginary military demarcation line (MDL) was 
established, and TODs were virtually positioned inside the infiltration field. Several raster-based 
detection probability maps were created using various terrain information pertaining to concealment 
and detection. The intermediate results were then merged together to create a final detection 
probability map. The objective function minimized the summed detection probability, or in other 
words, the cumulative detection probability on the routes. Then, a shortest-path-searching algorithm 
was applied to the final detection probability map, and the optimal infiltration routes from start point 
were identified. In order to reflect a dynamic real-world problem, the same approach was repeatedly 
applied one thousand times while the location of the TODs and start points were randomly changed 
under certain constraints. The accumulation of optimal infiltration routes can achieve an infiltration 
vulnerability map. This map can be used as an input layer in designing the optimal TOD locations 
from a surveillance perspective, which also requires simulation to maximize detection probability. 
Those results would indicate the value of dynamic simulation to the optimization problem as well as 
the value of the GIS framework to the solution of such complicated routing problems. 
2. Overview of Data and Methodology 
2.1. Description of Input Data 
VITD, DEM, and TOD detection probabilities were used to create detection probability maps in this 
study. Defined by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) military standard [24], VITD is 
a geospatial information standard containing exhaustive terrain information for military operations. 
Figure 1 shows six different layersof obstacles (OBS), slope/surface configurations (SLP), soil/surface 
materials (SMC), surface drainage (SDR), transportation (TRN), and vegetation (VEG) included in 
VITD data. The OBS coverage includes natural obstacles and man-made obstacles. The SLP coverage 
illustrates terrain objects of similar slope ranges. The unit of slope is the percent slope, and the 
minimum area is 5,000 m
2 (50 m × 100 m). The SMC coverage characterizes a soil classification 
system showing soil groups based on rock outcrops, permanent snowfields, evaporation, and other 
factors. The SDR coverage contains information on rivers, canals, hydrology, dams, lakes and various 
other bodies of water. The TRN coverage represents terrain attributes associated with different forms Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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of transportation including roadways, railways, bridges, tunnels, and airfields. The VEG coverage 
illustrates military-application-related landuse and various types of vegetation. The TRN, SLP and 
SMC layers can be used to evaluate the movement of vehicles, whereas the SDR coverage can be used 
to select hiding places [8]. VEG layer was used to compute concealment probability related to tree 
occlusions in this study. 
Figure 1. VITD’s Six Layers. (a) Obstacle (OBS). (b) Topography (SLP). (c) Soil (SMC). 
(d) Irrigation (SDR). (e) Transportation (TRN). (f) Vegetation (VEG). 
     
(a)     (b)     (c) 
     
(d)     (e)     (f) 
A high-resolution DEM is preferable to precisely depict real terrain. Therefore, a DEM of 5 m × 5 m 
cell size was created from the contour lines on a 1:5,000 scale Korean digital topographic map. The 
TOD surveillance locations are normally situated at positions with fully-open views to the front. 
Twelve TODs were assumed in this study, and their locations were determined according to terrain 
conditions, which will be discussed in detail in Section 3. The TOD detection probability was 
computed using the ACQUIRE model, as mentioned previously. The ACQUIRE model presents the 
detection probability for a given TOD with respect to distance, which is estimated through   
repetitive iterations. 
A large number of detection probability maps were created using concealment probability, 
viewshed analysis, and TOD detection probability. Concealment probability maps represent the 
probability of infiltration exposure based on terrain occlusions; viewshed analyses compute the visible 
area from TOD locations according to terrain occlusions and line of sight; and TOD detection 
probabilities imply computed viewing probability of all regions from TOD locations. 
Raster-based 50 m × 50 m probability maps were created using ArcGIS 9.0. Each cell has a 
detection probability value sensed by TOD, with regard to all of the associated features. The area of Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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experimentation was 20 km by 13 km, and the total number of nodes represented in the form of graph 
data structure was 104,000 (400 × 260). Map projection for all of the spatial data was UTM Zone 52 
on the datum of WGS84. 
2.2. Thermal Observation Device (TOD) 
TOD is a thermal imaging system which measures infrared energy emitted from a body with 
temperature. It extends our vision beyond the short-wavelength red into the far infrared by making the 
light, emitted by warm object, naturally visible [25]. It is also widely used in such areas as detection of 
energy loss from a building, measurement of storage quantity inside of a store tank, confirmation on 
abnormality of electrical transmission line, and lookout for trespassers. Recently, it finds its 
applications in the analysis and inspection of a printed circuit board, atmospheric survey by satellites, 
medical appliances, and so on. 
In military applications, the thermal imaging system is mainly used as an observation device for the 
precise identification of targets during the night. The true value of thermal imaging was well 
demonstrated during the Gulf war, where most of the military operations were conducted during the 
night. The night eyes must respond to the specific portion of electromagnetic waves emitted at 
temperature when solar radiation is absent. A thermal observation device used in this research provides 
stabilized images by utilizing several techniques such as serial and parallel scanning, and digital image 
processing techniques, wherein the resolution of image is up to 240,000 pixels per frame, and detection 
wavelength is far infrared band ranging from 8-12 μm. The overall system (Model-TAS-970K) 
configuration used in this research is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. The system (Model-TAS-970K) configuration. 
Operational frequency  far infrared(8~12 µm) 
Scanning method  1st generation serial-parallel scanning 
Magnification  3~10 × duplex magnification infrared optic 
Resolution  0.24 mega pixels 
Monitor  9 inch 
Focusing range  30 m~infinity 
Tripod height  47 cm~104 cm 
Operation  directly/indirectly/vehicle mounted 
Field of view 
3 × (6.3° × 10.1°) in wide mode 
10 × (2.0° × 3.1°) in narrow mode 
Power consumption 
DC 24 V ± 6 V (direct operation) 
AC 90 V~245 V (remote operation) 
Spinning angle 
horizontal: 360°, vertical: ± 22.5° (direct operation) 
horizontal: 350°, vertical: ± 80.0° (remote operation) 
Rotational speed  horizontal:1.5°/sec ~12.0°/sec, vertical: 0.3°/sec ~1.5°/sec 
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2.3. Optimal Infiltration-Route Analysis 
Infiltration is an important tactical operation in military applications, and various infiltration routes 
can be determined based on terrain, surveillance networks, weather, and other conditions. Figure 2 
shows a scenario to determine optimal infiltration routes across an imaginary military demarcation line 
(MDL) in Daejeon City. The blue horizontal line illustrates the infiltration start point, and the red 
horizontal line demarcates the end points. Ideally, the optimal infiltration route will have the lowest 
cumulative detection probability function (F). 
Figure 3 shows the overall procedure of a simulation-based infiltration-route analysis used in this 
research. Several layers were extracted from the vector-product interim terrain data (VITD), and they 
were used to compute the concealment and detection probability. A digital elevation model (DEM), 
which was created from contour lines on the digital maps, was used for viewshed analyses. The 
ACQUIRE model was used to compute the TOD detection probability. The ACQUIRE model, which 
has been developed by the U.S. Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate (NVESD), is a 
performance assessment model for night-vision systems that can compute detection probabilities of 
specific targets according to distance and weather, and is based on minimum resolvable temperature 
differences (MRTD) [26]. Raster-based detection probability maps were created and the A* algorithm 
was applied to the detection probability map to determine the optimal infiltration routes while taking 
into consideration the terrain conditions and surveillance networks. The above operations were 
repeated n-times while the locations of the TODs and infiltration start points were randomly selected 
and changed. The final result is achieved by accumulating the individual optimal routing results in the 
form of an infiltration vulnerability map. 
Figure 2. Imaginary scenario for optimal infiltration-route analysis (an imaginary MDL, Daejeon). 
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Figure 3. Optimal infiltration-route analysis procedure. 
 
3. Simulation Design 
3.1. Concealment Probability 
The concealment probability indicates the covering rate of infiltration with respect to vegetation 
and terrain occlusions. Table 2 shows the concealment probability parameters defined for the feature 
tables within the VEG coverage. In this study, the concealment probability was computed using three 
feature tables (i.e., vegarea (vegetation area), vgfarea (vegetation forested area), and vgwarea 
(vegetation water area)); vegarea represents bushes or woods; vgfarea, from which terrain occlusion 
rates (DMT: Density Measure–% of Tree/Canopy Cover) can be obtained, represents forests; and 
vgwarea, as a hydrologic layer, determines the concealment probability based on the terrain occlusion 
rates. DMT represents the terrain occlusion rate caused by trees, and four different value ranges can be Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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assigned for individual feature tables (See Table 2). In this research, the mid values of the ranges were 
used to compute the concealment probabilities. For the vegarea and vfwarea feature tables, the smallest 
DMT range values were used, since these are open-area regions. Figure 4 shows the overall 
concealment probability within the project site; the dark area indicates a low concealment probability, 
whereas the bright area represents a high concealment probability. 
Table 2. Concealment probability parameters. 
Layer  vegarea vgfarea vgfarea vgfarea vgfarea vfwarea 
DMT (%)  - 0–25  25–50  50–75  75–100  - 
Concealment 
probability 
0.125 0.125 0.375 0.625 0.875 0.125 
Figure 4. Concealment probability. 
 
3.2. Viewshed Analysis and TOD Detection Probability 
The detection probability was computed for all TOD locations, and those probabilities were then 
integrated with the results of viewshed analysis for the individual TOD locations. Figure 5 shows 
examples of TOD location. The TOD looks for invaders with a width of 0.5 m and a height of 1.5 m, 
and can detect objects having a 3 ºC temperature difference within neighborhoods under clear weather 
conditions. Figure 6 shows the range of computed detection probabilities, which addresses human-size 
targets according to distanceusing the ACQUIRE modelunder clear weather conditions. Raster maps 
were created using the multiple buffer functionality in ArcGIS to represent distance-based detection 
probability from TOD locations. A bright tone near TOD locations indicates a high detection 
probability, and a darker tone farther away from TOD locations indicates a low detection probability.  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure 5. Locations of TODs. 
 
 
Figure 6. Detection probability of TOD location. 
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Figure 7. Viewshed analysis from individual TOD location. 
 
Figure 8. Individual TOD detection probability fused with viewshed analysis. 
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Viewshed analysis, using a DEM, was also performed to compute terrain-occluded regions.   
Figure 7 shows the viewshed analysis results from a TOD location. Observable regions from TOD 
locations are illustrated in white and black regions are considered non-observable. The TOD detection 
probability map and the viewshed analysis result map can be merged together by multiplying the two 
values in the corresponding cells. Accordingly, for each TOD location, the TOD detection probability 
and the result of the viewshed analysis were sequentially merged to compute a new TOD detection 
probability considering terrain conditions (See Figure 8). The detection probabilities from all of the 
TOD locations were merged using Equations (1) and (2): 
        ) ) ) ) ( (( ) ( 3 2 1 3 2 1 n n X X X X P X X X X P ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ = ∪ ∪ ∪ ∪ " " "    (1) 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 X X P X P X P X X P ∩ − + = ∪      ( 2 )  
where P(X1∪X2) indicates the detection probability computed from at least one TOD; P(X1) and P(X2) 
represent individual detection probabilities from each TOD; and P(X1∩X2) represents the detection 
probability from both TODs. 
3.3. Detection Probability Map 
The final detection probability map was created by merging the concealment probability, C(x, y) 
(see Section 3.1), and the TOD detection probability, D(x, y) (see Section 3.2), where x, y represent 
column and row numbers, respectively, in a two-dimensional map. The TOD detection probability is 
positively correlated to the final detection probability, whereas the concealment probability map is 
negatively correlated to the final detection probability. The final detection probability is 1.0, when 
there is no concealment. The detection probability becomes 0 for the reverse case when the 
concealment is perfect (100 Accordingly the relationship between the final detection probability and 
the concealment probability can be written as Equation (3). Finally, Equation (4) is used to merge the 
two detection probabilities: 
)) , ( 1 ( ) , ( y x C y x P − ∝        ( 3 )  
)) , ( 1 )( , ( ) , ( y x C y x D y x P − =        ( 4 )  
The final detection probability map after merging the concealment probability and the TOD 
detection probability is shown in Figure 9. During the route analyses, the final detection probability 
map was considered as two-dimensional graphs with cells having 8-neighbors. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure 9. Final detection probability map. 
 
3.4. Dynamic Simulations 
To this point, in building the detection probability map, the fixed locations of TODs and the 
infiltration start points were assumed, as illustrated in Figure 9. However, it is far from realistic to 
know both locations in a real-world problem, and each party can control, only, either the TOD 
location, in the defensive posture, or the location of the start point and the infiltration path, in the 
offensive posture. In order to reflect a real-world problem, the dynamic conditions of both 
parameters—the location of the TOD and of the start point—should be considered in the analysis. 
Consequently, the generation of numerous detection probability maps according to the changes of 
TOD location and random selections of infiltration start lines, is required. One thousand detection 
probability maps were produced under the assumption that the TOD location is changed. Also, twelve 
points on the start line of the infiltration route were randomly selected for each simulation. It would be 
a more comprehensive analysis if all of the points on the start line were used for the simulations; 
however, owing to the unmanageable computational overhead that would be incurred, that approach was 
not used. The TOD locations were selected under several constraints reflecting real-world conditions. The 
first was the location range of each TOD, which was evenly assigned in order to prevent unnecessary TOD 
overlap (Figure 10). The second was the condition of each TOD from the perspective of viewshed 
coverage—as mentioned, it is natural to locate it on the summit of a mountain or wherever it affords a 
wide and open view. To formulate the conditions, a viewshed analysis was applied to each pixel in the 
range of the TOD installation, and pixels of 40% viewshed in the infiltration zone were considered for 
potential TOD locations. The threshold of 40% viewshed was decided after investigating proper ranges 
of TOD locations in the given topography. Figure 11 illustrates the analysis and shows the   
TOD-location candidates.  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure 10. Setup for dynamic simulations. 
 
3.5. Optimization Algorithms 
The A* algorithm is used to minimize a cost function, f = g + h, where, g is the cost obtained from 
the initial node to the current node, and h is the estimated cost, according to the heuristic function, 
obtained from the current node to the goal node. In practice, if the value of h is 0, then the A* 
algorithm is equal to Dijkstra’s algorithm, which is guaranteed to find the shortest path. If the 
estimates of h are exactly equal to the real cost, then A* will only follow the best path, with minimum 
costs. However, if the estimates of h are sometimes greater than the real cost, then A* is not 
guaranteed to find the best path, though it can run faster than when h is equal to the real cost.   
Russell  et al. [27] stated that the A* algorithm is effective when the heuristic function is not 
overestimated. Therefore, an evaluation for time complexity, completeness, and the optimality of the 
A* algorithm is largely dependent upon the heuristic function. Inthis research, the cost function (g) 
was defined as the cumulative detection probability from the initial node to the current node [see 
Equation (5)], and the heuristic function (h) was defined as the multiplication of the shortest distance 
between the initial node and the current node and the detection probability coefficient (μdetect) of 
…….
Infiltration Field
TOD location Zone 
12 assigned zones 
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corresponding cells. Thus, the optimal solution could be obtained with a smaller μdetect. In other words, 
by minimizing the estimates of h, the obtained solutions will be close to the optimal routes: 
∑
∈
=
A y x
y x P g
) , (
) , (        ( 5 )  
where A represents the collection of passed nodes: 
 
t detec goal Y y h μ × − =        ( 6 )  
where Ygoal is the y-coordinates of the end locations (see Figure 1). Thus, |y − Ygoal| represents the 
distance from the current node to the destination line. 
Figure 11. Conditions for TOD Locations. (a) The viewshed analysis result for each pixel 
(The bright zone represents the location of the larger viewshed in the infiltration zone).  
(b) The final candidate locations for TOD setups (white zone: >40% viewshed, black zone: 
<40% viewshed in the infiltration zone). 
 
(a)          (b) 
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4. Experiments and Analyses 
For the simulation, the standard detection probability (μdetect) value was tested and determined to be 
between 0.01 and 0.10 from the probability map within the project site. Figure 12 shows the path-
searching results obtained using the A* algorithm with varying μdetect. values. The patterns illustrate 
the effects of the detection probability: the routes, down to the infiltration field, become straighter as 
the value becomes larger. In other words, the remaining distance from the current node to the 
destination has a strong influence on the computation of the total cost function. The shortest path tends 
to run south with an increasing cumulative detection probability. As only twelve TOD points were 
selected from the infiltration start line for each simulation, the tendency towards straight routing would 
inhibit the discovery of vulnerable pixels in the infiltration field. For that reason, the value of 0.01 was 
chosen for μdetect. for the remaining simulations. 
Figure 12. Infiltration-route results with varying μdetect values. (a) μdetect = 0.01 
 (b) μdetect = 0.03 (c) μdetect =0.10. 
 
 (a)               (b)                     (c) 
 
Figure 13 illustrates the cumulative optimal route result - an infiltration vulnerability map—
generated from 1,000 simulations. As mentioned, each simulation had twelve TODs at randomly 
selected locations, the infiltrations starting from twelve randomly selected points on the infiltration 
start line. Consequently, a total of 12,000 infiltrations were simulated, the optimal routes were 
overlapped to build an infiltration occurrence map. The Figure shows the vulnerable pixels, that is, 
those at which there were a high number of infiltration occurrences, in a brighter color. The result 
presents a clear pattern of infiltration vulnerability in mountainous areas where detection probability is 
generally reduced due to topographic occlusions and dense vegetations. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure 13. Cumulative paths of optimal infiltration routes (from 1,000 simulations). 
 
 
The value of the infiltration vulnerability map (Figure 13) can be substantiated with additional 
analysis for the design of a defense strategy. In order to accomplish an optimal anti-infiltration TOD 
defense network, TODs should be located at the positions where the total summed detection 
probability in the infiltration field is maximized with the vulnerability weights (i.e., infiltration 
occurrences). In other words, by maximizing the function k of the following equation, the TOD 
locations can constitute the optimal defense network: 
∑
∈
=
S y x
y x P y x O k
) , (
) , ( ) , (        ( 7 )  
where S stands for the infiltration field, O(x, y) is the infiltration occurrence at the given position (x, y) 
according to the infiltration vulnerability map, P(x,  y) is same as the Equation 4 which can be 
regenerated while moving the TOD locations. An additional 1,000 simulations were conducted, in 
which 1,000 different TOD-location setups were randomly generated under the same constraints 
described in Section 3.4 and shown in Figure 11. The TOD setup having the maximum value k was 
considered the optimal TOD network defense design. Figure 14 shows the optimal TOD locations for 
the vulnerable infiltration routes, with the corresponding detection probability map in the background. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure 14. Optimal locations of TODs for vulnerable infiltration routes (from 1,000 simulations). 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
For tactical military operations, infiltration-route analysis can provide ground infiltration routing in 
an attack mode, and can be used to determine the locations of defensive surveillance system equipment 
and guards. This research presented an optimal routing technique that determines, by dynamic 
simulations, potential infiltration routes in a GIS environment. Raster-based detection probability maps 
were created by geospatial analyses, including multiple buffering, 3D viewshed analysis, raster 
processing, and overlaying for the computation of concealment and detection probabilities. After 
building a cost map according to the final detection probability of each cell, the A* algorithm was 
applied to determine the optimal infiltration route by minimizing the objective function - summed 
detection probability on the route. This simulation process was repeated under different conditions, 
and an infiltration vulnerability map—showing infiltration occurrences—was created. All of the 
processes were conducted in the GIS environment. The value of dynamic simulation in the GIS 
environment was also demonstrated with another round of simulations for optimal TOD locations 
under the same constraints. 
For more realistic infiltration analysis, additional computationally intensive simulations can be 
conducted. Simulations of 1,000 iterations are far from sufficient to claim ‘optimal’ route analysis, 
though they are probably more than enough to confirm the feasibility of the solution framework. Also, 
for a more realistic analytical result, meticulous design of constraints such as the number and condition 
of TODs as well as infiltration moving patterns and behavior, would be required. 
The proposed technique, dynamic simulation in the GIS environment, can also provide 
comprehensive spatial analysis results for selecting optimized sites or routes for infrastructure facilities 
(e.g., roadways, railways, power-lines and oil/gas pipelines) or structures (e.g., bridges, power stations, Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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etc.). Such dynamic simulations with spatial analyses would be feasible in the GIS environment, and 
the solution framework could be used, with minor modifications, for other applications, such as 
optimizing horizontal highway alignments. The means of locating civil infrastructures, based on 
terrain and other constraints, is always an important issue and dynamic simulation in the GIS 
environment can provide a feasible solution to this matter. 
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